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Indexing Terms: physician prediction . heuristics . cognitive bias . judgmentlimitations . factors affecting physicians' judgments Associated with efforts to address our spiraling health-care costs has come an increasing emphasis on the development and evaluation of explicit clinical strategies.
The recognition of widespread practice variation by Wennberg (1, 2) and others has led to an increasing proportion of health-care research funds and hospital resources being directed at outcomes assessment and improvement (e.g., [3] [4] [5] . One of the explicit goals of current research into practice variation is the creation of clinical policies or guidelines, which, it is believed, will both diminish practice variation and enhance quality of care. 
ClinicalPrediction
An activity that is common to all of the clinical tasks I have just reviewed, and that is essential to rational decision-making, is clinical prediction. The clinical prediction process can be divided into three components: the data that are available to use in prediction, the method used to actually make the prediction, and the accuracy of the prediction. Each of these three components can be further subdivided into important parts. Data used for clinical prediction can come from a wide variety of sources: history, physical exminiition, laboratory tests, radiological procedures, surgical observations, pathology specimens, questionnaires, other observations, and other measurements.
Any of these data can be viewed and analyzed as if they were "tests." Even when these data are collected in a valid and reproducible manner at the individual patient level, conclusions about the relationship between the "test" and outcome of interest can be influenced greatly by both spectrum and some forms of bias (6, 7). "Spectrum" refers to the kinds of patients from whom predictive data are derived. For an individual clinician, it would represent his or her case mix. For a study, the spectrum would be determined by the sample selection process and the specific inclusion and exclusion criteria that were applied. Bias can creep in from multiple sources. For diagnostic tests, the most important sources of bias to examine are the processes by which the test is determined to be positive or negative and how the disease is determined to be present or absent (6). We also need to be concerned about the qualities of our inaccurate predictions.
It is common for false-positive and false-negative errors to have different implications for the clinical course of disease and for care provided (8, 9). As such, it is important not only to determine the quantity of errors made but also to assess the qualitative aspects of correct and incorrect predictions. Assessing the risks, benefits, and costs of obtaining certain pieces of information can lead to important insights into the overall utifity of such information.
MethodologicalFactors InfluencingTest Characteristics
We all recognize the importance of prevalence in the interpretation of tests, but as was described earlier, how well a test performs also can be influenced by spectrum, that is, the kinds of subjects studied. Bias can occur both in the assessment of test results as being positive or negative and in the assessment of the disease state as being present or absent. Both spectrum and bias can affect test characteristics (sensitivity and specificity).
Spectrum.
The sensitivity of a test should be evaluated in a broad range of patients who have the disease in question. Thus, in the diseased group, the pathological component of spectrum would reflect the extent and location of disease, the clinical component would reflect the severity and chronicity of symptoms, and comorbidity would reflect other diseases that may influence the false-negative rate (6). Specificity should be examined in a broad range of patients who do not have the disease in question (6 The ROC curve plots sensitivity, or truepositive rate, against 1 -specificity, or false-positive rate (see Figure 1 ). The 450 line denotes random discrimination. The closer a curve is to the left upper corner, the better the discrimination.
The index of discrimination is the area under the ROC curve, which varies from 0.5 to 1.0. The higher the ROC area, the better the discrimina- The calibration curve plots the predicted values and actual values against one another, e.g., the predicted probability of disease might be plotted against actual frequency of disease for each decile of probability (see Figure 2 ). Lens model analysis (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) , depicted schematically in Figure 3 , is a method for formally comparing the use of clinical information to make judgments with the "inherent" predictive capabilities of the available information. One can determine which clinical variables tend to be used by physicians when they make judgments (r8 in Figure 3) difference in area between the two curves, 0.10, suggests that the decision aid may outperform physicians' judgment. Owing to the small number of patients in this sample who had pneumonia (n = 15), the power to detect a difference of 0.10 was limited, however.
Studies of physicians' estimates of prognosis for intensive-care-unit patients have generally shown very good physician discrimination.
A typical example is the ROC curve shown in Figure 4 from a study of intensive-careunit patients by Brannen et al. (36) . In this study, physicians had significantly better discrimination than the APACHE II severity system for predicting mortality. The spectrum of patients in this study had important differences from the patient groups in which the APACHE system was developed and validated, however. however. For example, it is not influenced by the prior probability of the disease or outcome of interest. Nor is it influenced by the fact that data obtained from a small sample may be an unreliable estimator of the underlying (population) characteristic (e.g., a single blood-pressure reading vs an individual's average blood pressure). Pattern recognition fails to account for the phenomenon of regression to the mean, events that occur by chance alone, and the degree to which the event in questions is even predictable.
The "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic is used in circumstances in which an initial probability estimate is updated as new information becomes available. For example, when physicians clinically assess cardiac output, some predictive information comes from the history and additional information comes from the physical examination.
Based on the initial impression from the history and physical, the likelihood that cardiac output is abnormal could be increased or decreased based on information from the ECG, chest radiograph, and laboratory data. The initial data provide the initial estimate; adjustment takes place after new data are available. The problem with this approach is that people tend to be too conservative when they adjust their initial estimate upward or downward, as if they were truly "anchored" to their initial estimate. the following phenomenon: after an event has occurred, we believe we could have more easily predicted its occurrence than is true if we had been asked to predict it beforehand (53). Hindsight bias may produce especially troublesome results in malpractice cases where judgments are always made from a position of hindsight.
It may also affect second opinions. When the second evaluator is aware of the first diagnosis made, he or she may be more likely to agree with that diagnosis than is warranted by the available data. Hindsight bias has been shown to occur in clinicopathological conferences (54). Physicians in the audience at these conferences were randomly divided into two groups. The first (foresight) group provided a differential diagnosis after all the clinical information was available but before the pathological diagnosis was discussed.
The second (hindsight) group provided their differential diagnosis at the end of the conference and were asked to do so as if they did not know the final diagnosis.
Compared with foresight physicians, the hindsight physicians were significantly more likely to give the correct diagnosis as first on their list of differential diagnoses (30% vs 50%, respectively).
"Regret"
or "value-induced" bias is the "chagrin factor" in clinical medicine that Feinstein has written about (55). Anticipated regret can affect probability estimates.
People tend to distort probability estimates by combining two steps in the decision-making process, i.e., allowing the undesirability of a given diagnosis or outcome to alter the estimate of its likelihood of occurrence. When we anticipate the regret we would feel after having missed a given diagnosis, we may overestimate the probability of its occurrence. For instance, we would likely regret missing significant coronary artery disease in a young man with atypical chest pain. When we see young men with atypical chest pain, we may tend to feel that coronary artery disease is more likely than it really is. This reason for inaccurate probability assessment may lead even the best physicians among us astray. Value-induced bias, rather than greed or other explanations, may be at the root of test ordering for patients who objectively can be shown to be at low risk for the disease in question.
Information Synthesis
Three additional factors can impede optimal information synthesis.
The first is the tendency for us to seek only information that will confirm rather than disconfirm our hypotheses.
Physicians as well as nonphysicians tend to seek information that can only be used to confirm hypotheses (56, 57). The confirmatory bias may influence the process of data interpretation as well. In an evaluation of hypothetical cases, medical students and practicing physicians were shown to use low-relevance information as being supportive of their own diagnostic hypotheses (58). People have been shown to regularly ignore negative evidence, even though it must be used to make decisions optimally. It is as if intuitive human information processing is rather inept at using negative evidence, i.e., "normal" findings. Physicians have been shown to use abnormal, but not normal findings, in diagnosing pneumonia in adult outpatients, even though both types of information are required for efficient diagnosis
(59).
Apparently it is easier to learn that the presence of moderate to severe cough increases the likelihood of pneumonia than it is to learn that the absence of rhinorrhea also increases the likelihood of pneumonia.
"Framing," which represents different ways the same information can be presented to people, has been shown to greatly influence, and sometimes reverse, preferences about medical therapies.
This phenomenon was demonstrated by McNeil et al. (60) in a study that compared the attractiveness of surgery vs radiation therapy for the treatment of lung cancer. The participants were a large group of ambulatory patients (who did not have lung cancer), a group of physicians, and a group of graduate students. The attractiveness of surgery was substantially enhanced when the treatments were identified rather than not specifically identified, when the information consisted of life expectancy rather than cumulative probability, and when the problem was framed as the probability of living rather than in terms of the probability of dying. Framing effects have raised ethical concerns because the method in which exactly the same information is presented can influence the choice of therapy for the majority of patients. This realization could lead to the active manipulation of choices by the person or persons presenting the information.
Illusion of Validity
We are often unaware of errors in judgment that we may have made in usual clinical practice.
Ethical or pragmatic constraints often prevent the type of feedback that would be necessary to identify and correct such mistakes.
This phenomenon has been called the "fflusion of validity" (49, 61). This phenomenon is especially problematic for judgments about diseases that have a variable course. We suspect the presence of the disease; we suggest a treatment; the patient improves and we assume it was due to our treatment.
The risky or costly gold-standard test to confirm the diagnosis may not have been performed-or perhaps the gold-standard test simply doesn't exist. Well-designed studies of clinical decision-making may be our only opportunity to sort out and correct some of the misperceptions we have developed in usual clinical practice.
Human Judgment vs Analytical Approaches
Findings from a large body of literature summarized by Hammond (62) allow us to make some generalizations about the properties of intuitive as compared with analytical approaches to decision-making (see Table 2 ). Would you please address this?
Neal Dawson: We have not looked at that specifically, but I agree with you in terms of saying the laboratory probably plays a very small role in terms of contributing to the "noise" in the prediction. When these sorts of studies are done, it is important to look at the incremental value of the information.
We should assess it the same way the physician would ordinarily collect it.
After having done the history, the physical, and some routine tests, by the time you get to the single specialized laboratory test, it may well be that a lot of the predictive information has already been captured by other variables. The incremental value of the laboratory test would certainly be important to examine. To address your specific point, I agree that the laboratoryassociated variation would be "peanuts" in the context of the full process. What we are attempting to define here is how much uncertainty in our data would be allowable, were we using our data properly.
Neal Dawson: I think we do ourselves a disservice when we make the dichotomy between subjective and "objective" data. Science, despite protestations to the contrary,
is not a totally value-free enterprise, not a completely unsubjective enterprise. Time and time again, it has been shown to be a human endeavor, just like anything else we do. The question we should put forward with respect to what kinds of data we should use to make predictions or clinical decisions is, how good are they for the purpose we want them to serve? Are they reproducible?
Are they valid or accurate? If they are, it doesn't really matter from what source they are derived. Other criteria can be applied. What is the cost of acquiring the data? One should not just send everyone to a laboratory or draw blood from everybody without any thought of the prior probability of certain diseases. Clinical information certainly can outperform laboratory tests for some purposes: for example, the activity of rheumatoid arthritis can be followed as well or better by use of questionnaires than by determination of the erythrocyte sedimentation rate. There are probably numerous ways of arriving at the same point with respect to information.
In general, it is better to take into consideration the usual acquisition sequence.
The history and physical, for example, are extremely valuable endeavors for getting the physician to "the right ballpark" for a diagnosis.
Once a confined differential diagnosis is clear, then other things such as laboratory tests and sometimes predictive instruments can begin to sort out the differential diagnosis.
These tools are important because they tend to use information more optimally than do our own judgments, but they are often not very good for making broad characterizations.
We 
